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[1207] 
Sticky Regulations and Net Neutrality Restoring 
Internet Freedom 
AARON L. NIELSON† 
Stable law is valuable, yet also remarkably lacking in our nation’s internet policy. Over the last 
two decades, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has charted a zigzagging course 
between heavier and lighter regulation. Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit largely upheld the agency’s latest shift—this time toward deregulation. But in 
2016, that same court upheld the agency’s shift in the opposite direction. And to top it all off, some 
predict that after political control of the White House shifts, the FCC may again reverse course 
and reinstate a policy similar to what the FCC has recently overridden. The upshot of this series 
of policy reversals is that it is difficult for anyone to make long-term investment decisions 
premised on any particular internet policy because that policy may not have a long shelf life. This 
makes it harder for the private sector to plan and for the FCC to encourage investment.  
This Essay, however, is not about internet policy. Rather, it uses this example to examine 
stickiness more broadly, as well as whether and how that stickiness can or should be increased. 
To the extent, for instance, that we believe that greater stability is sufficiently valuable, which is 
debatable, it may make sense to revisit aspects of administrative law that make it relatively easy 
for agencies to reverse course, including adding more procedural steps or requiring better 
explanations to change policy. Ultimately, however, administrative law likely will not be able to 
create stability for controversial, highly-salient issues. When it comes to achieving the social 
benefits of stability, rulemaking is a poor substitute for legislation.  
  
 
 †  Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The Author thanks Gus Hurwitz 
for reviewing a draft of this Essay. 
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“The Commission’s authority under the Act includes classifying various services 
into the appropriate statutory categories. In the years since the Act’s passage, 
the Commission has exercised its classification authority with some frequency.”1 
“[I]n a world in which regulated parties reasonably lack confidence in the 
stability of the regulatory scheme, agencies are less able to pursue policies with 
longer time horizons.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) decision to replace the agency’s so-called “Net Neutrality” 
or “Open Internet” order,3 issued in 2015,4 with the FCC’s “Restoring Internet 
Freedom” order, issued in 2018.5 The 2018 order adopts “a market-based, ‘light-
touch’ policy for governing the Internet and depart[s] from [the agency’s] 2015 
order that had imposed utility-style regulation.”6 This policy reversal is a big 
deal for internet policy in the United States. But this was not the FCC’s first 
reversal. The FCC’s 2015 policy marked a reversal from an earlier FCC policy 
that itself—arguably—also was a reversal from yet another earlier FCC policy. 
In other words, the FCC has been zigzagging on fundamental policy issues 
governing the internet for a long time. And not surprisingly, the “zigs” and the 
“zags” correspond with changes in presidential administrations. The upshot of 
this series of significant reversals is that the D.C. Circuit’s 2019 decision 
strongly suggests that any reliance by private industry on the FCC’s 2015 policy 
was foolhardy given the prospect of change.7 
The D.C. Circuit’s skepticism of reliance on the FCC’s 2015 policy was 
surely correct—at least descriptively. Judged against black-letter administrative 
law, which largely allows agencies to change policy just as the FCC has 
repeatedly done,8 no reasonable participant in the telecommunications industry 
could have been that confident following the creation of the FCC’s 2015 policy 
that a new administration wouldn’t come into power and chart a different course. 
The same point is true for those making investment decisions today—it would 
be risky to place too much confidence in the FCC’s 2018 policy, which also may 
not be long for this world. Should the White House flip political hands in 2020 
 
 1. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 
 2. Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 91 (2018). 
 3. Well, mostly upheld. The Court sided against the agency on some points, but did not vacate the entire 
order. See Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18. 
 4. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) (“2015 Order”). The 2015 
Order is often called the “Net Neutrality” or “Open Internet” order. See, e.g., A Brief History of Net Neutrality, 
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/amp-stories/net-neutrality-timeline/ (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 5. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) (“2018 Order”). 
 6. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17. 
 7. Id. at 64 (“[I]n light of the Commission’s approach to classifying cable modem service and Internet 
access since the late 1990s, the Title II Order could reasonably have been viewed as a regulatory step that might 
soon be reversed. . . . Any reliance on the rules of the Title II Order would not have been reasonable unless 
tempered by substantial concerns for legal or political jeopardy.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 2, at 90–92. 
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or 2024, the FCC, under new management, presumably will revert to something 
like the 2015 policy. 
Whether the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion should be correct, however, is a 
different question. Is this really the sort of regulatory system we want—one in 
which major policies zigzag from administration to administration? Elsewhere I 
have discussed the concept of “sticky regulations”—regulations backed by a 
credible agency commitment that the policy will not be changed too soon.9 
Stickiness allows regulated parties to invest with greater confidence that they 
will be able to recoup their investment over the long run, which enhanced 
investment in turn better allows agencies to pursue long-term policies. 
Few aspects of administrative law, however, provide stickiness. Agencies 
receive deference for many legal questions, which—per the Brand X doctrine—
sometimes allows them to override judicial decisions that would otherwise lock 
policy in place.10 And per Fox Television, agencies also do not bear an especially 
heavy burden when reversing prior policy, as the APA “makes no 
distinction . . . between initial agency action and subsequent agency action 
undoing or revising that action.”11 And although an agency sometimes must 
“provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy 
created on a blank slate,” for instance “when its prior policy has engendered 
serious reliance interests,”12 that principle seems to have little force when it 
comes to zigzagging policies, as the very act of zigzagging by the agency makes 
it harder for reasonable “reliance interests” to develop in the first place.13 
Accordingly, in many cases, to the extent stickiness exists at all, it is the product 
of administrative law’s procedures and in particular the very “ossification” that 
those procedures are said to produce.14 
The FCC’s pattern of crafting major policies for internet regulation and 
then reversing those policies when presidential administrations change casts 
doubt on whether “ossification” provides meaningful stickiness, at least for 
high-profile, politically-salient policies, for which agencies may be able to 
“speed things along if they are motivated to do so.”15 To the extent that stickiness 
is valuable,16 the question thus becomes what can be done to make law more 
stable. 
 
 9. See id. at 89–90. 
 10. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Jonathan 
Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2007) 
(explaining implications of Brand X). 
 11. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 14. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 89–90. Whether the rulemaking process is, in fact, ossified is the subject 
of a spirited academic debate. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 
1219 (2018) (discussing the debate). 
 15. Nielson, supra note 14, at 1218. 
 16. As I have explained elsewhere, stickiness is not always valuable. Sometimes an agency “just wants 
some activity to stop.” Id. at 1237. Likewise, the desire to create stickiness may also create perverse incentives, 
especially for controversial policies. 
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Using the FCC’s stabs at internet regulation as an example, this Essay 
explores how to increase policy stickiness. For instance, the Supreme Court or 
Congress could revisit Brand X or Fox, two cases that make it harder for 
agencies to credibly commit to particular policies. Similarly, Congress is free to 
require additional procedures for the regulatory process, especially for the 
highest profile rules. Finally, it may be time to expand the so-called “major 
questions” doctrine, which would leave the most important policies to Congress. 
Because statutes are almost always stickier than regulations, perhaps certain 
categories of policies are simply poor fits for the administrative process. To be 
clear, my point here is not that any or all of these options are worthwhile. 
Stickiness, after all, may not be worth the price. But if that is the conclusion, no 
one should complain about instability and diminished investment. 
I.  REGULATING THE INTERNET 
The FCC’s zigzagging approach to internet regulation is not a secret.17 
Here, I’ll briefly summarize the story.  
A. THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress enacted “two potential 
classifications for broadband Internet: ‘telecommunications services’ under 
Title II of the Act and ‘information services’ under Title I.”18 The distinction 
matters a great deal, as a Title II designation carries with it “common carrier 
status” that in turn “triggers an array of statutory restrictions and requirements,” 
including a prohibition on “‘unjust or unreasonable’” conduct.19 As mushy 
words like “unjust or unreasonable” suggest, the FCC has a great deal of 
discretion over common carriers. “Information services,” by contrast, are not 
subject to “common carriage status.”20 
Which classification to use thus is a significant question—the answer to 
which prompts strong opinions, often with a political and ideological tint. In 
particular, those who believe that internet providers should be subject to heavier 
regulation believe that the FCC should classify those providers as 
 
 17. See, e.g., John Blevins, The Use and Abuse of “Light-Touch” Internet Regulation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 
177, 185 (2019) (examining at length “the historical origins and limitations of the light-touch narrative”); Justin 
(Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old; Something New, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665, 671–75 (2015); 
Jay S. Kaplan, Finding the Middle Ground: A Proposed Solution to the Net Neutrality Debate, 26 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 230, 232 (2018) (explaining “four time periods” of “internet regulation”); see also Randolph J. May, 
The Ongoing Saga of Chevron and Net Neutrality, REG. REV. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/ 
2019/10/21/may-ongoing-saga-chevron-net-neutrality/ (examining “the long saga of back-and-forth regulatory 
treatment of internet access regulation”). 
 18. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17. 
 19. Id.; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005) 
(“Telecommunications carrier . . . must charge just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates to their customers, 
design their systems so that other carriers can interconnect with their communications networks, and contribute 
to the federal ‘universal service’ fund.”) (citations omitted). 
 20. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17. 
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“telecommunications services,” while those who favor a light-touch regime push 
for an “information services” classification. 
B. THE AMBIGUOUS EARLY PERIOD 
The FCC first addressed this issue in 1998, briefly, when it determined that 
internet (then over telephone lines) should be classified as a 
“telecommunications service.”21 The agency’s analysis, however, was far from 
pellucid. The FCC “conclude[d] that advanced services,” which the agency had 
defined to mean broadband, “are telecommunications services.”22 The agency 
quickly went on, however, to say that no one had disagreed “that a carrier 
offering such a service is offering a ‘telecommunications service,’” and noted 
that “[a]n end-user may utilize a telecommunications service together with an 
information service, as in the case of Internet access.”23 Around the same time, 
however, the FCC prepared the so-called “Stevens Report” for Congress that 
“concluded that Internet access providers do not offer ‘telecommunications 
service’ when they furnish Internet access to their customers.”24 
In 2000, the FCC solicited public comments about whether to classify cable 
broadband as a “telecommunications service.”25 
C. THE 2002 CLASSIFICATION 
In 2002, after receiving comments, the FCC concluded that cable 
broadband should be classified as an “information service.”26 Notably, the 
agency did this, in part, “to remove regulatory uncertainty that in itself may 
discourage investment and innovation.”27 The FCC reasoned that certainty—
especially, perhaps, deregulatory certainty—would encourage cable broadband 
providers and related companies to invest in infrastructure.28 Over the next five 
years, the agency extended that decision to broadband more generally.29 
The FCC’s classification of cable broadband was challenged in the Ninth 
Circuit. In 2000, the Ninth Circuit had held—in a case to which the FCC was 
 
 21. See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24011 
(1998). 
 22. Id. at 24029; see also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing this history). 
 23. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24030. 
 24. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11541 (1998). 
 25. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 
19287, 19296–98 (2000). 
 26. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 
4798, 4802 (2002). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 4801–02. The order further emphasized the agency’s statutory charge to “‘encourag[e] the 
deployment . . . of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans’ by . . . regulating methods that 
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2018)). 
 29. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 
22 FCC 5901 (2007); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 
FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005). 
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not a party—that a cable model service is a “telecommunications service.”30 This 
decision was made prior to the FCC’s classification decision, so the court was 
in a position where it had to interpret the statute as a matter of first impression, 
without deference. In 2003, in a case subsequent both to its 2000 opinion finding 
that cable internet service was a telecommunications service and the FCC’s 2002 
contrary classification of cable broadband as an information service, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the court’s earlier decision controlled and was binding on 
the FCC.31 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Brand X.32 The Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Thomas, concluded that the FCC’s classification decision 
was entitled to Chevron deference,33 and, in so doing, rejected an argument 
about the risk of agency inconsistency. In particular, Justice Thomas explained 
that “inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at 
most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious 
change.”34 But an explained change is generally permissible “since the whole 
point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a 
statute with the implementing agency,” especially because “[a]n initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”35 Hence, Brand X holds that “[a] 
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion.”36 Importantly, the Court stressed that 
allowing a prior judicial decision to trump an agency’s subsequent interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute “would ‘lead to the ossification of large portions of our 
statutory law,’ by precluding agencies from revising unwise judicial 
constructions of ambiguous statutes.”37 
After establishing that agencies are not per se bound by earlier judicial 
decisions, the Justices concluded that the FCC’s interpretation of 
“telecommunications service” was entitled to Chevron deference because the 
1996 Act was sufficiently ambiguous and the FCC’s decision was reasonable.38 
 
 30. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing AT&T Corp. v. 
Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 31. Id. at 1132. 
 32. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 972 (2005). 
 33. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 34. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 981. 
 35. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64). 
 36. Id. at 982. 
 37. Id. at 983 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
 38. See id. at 989–1000. 
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D. THE 2015 RECLASSIFICATION 
In 2015, the FCC—following a decade of court-rejected efforts to impose 
more internet regulations39—reversed course and concluded that broadband 
internet access is a telecommunications service after all.40 After public comment, 
the agency concluded that reclassification was necessary “to bring a decade of 
debate to a certain conclusion.”41 The FCC also explained its reversal, reasoning 
that “the facts in the market today are very different from the facts that supported 
the Commission’s 2002 decision to treat cable broadband as an information 
service and its subsequent application to fixed and mobile broadband 
services.”42 The agency stressed, however, that it would not regulate too 
aggressively, “consistent with further investment and broadband deployment.”43 
The agency also read Fox broadly, reasoning that the agency had no “special 
burden” to account for reliance interests and that “the regulatory history 
regarding the classification of broadband Internet access service would not 
provide a reasonable basis for assuming that the service would receive sustained 
treatment as an information service.”44 
That policy reversal was unsuccessfully challenged in the D.C. Circuit in 
2016.45 The court concluded that, under Brand X, the FCC’s new legal 
conclusion was entitled to deference because the statute is ambiguous and the 
FCC’s conclusion was reasonable.46 The panel majority also rejected an 
argument that the FCC’s reclassification was arbitrary and capricious because it 
upset reliance interests.47 Among other points, the majority accepted the FCC’s 
characterization of the zigzagging history of regulation and concluded that the 
agency’s view that there was not enough reliance to prevent reclassification was 
sufficiently explained, especially given the agency’s views about changed 
factual circumstances.48 Judge Williams, in dissent, disagreed.49 
 
 39. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the agency’s 2010 
order unlawfully regulated internet access as common carriage); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 642–43 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting an effort to regulate “network management practices”). 
 40. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015); A Brief History of Net 
Neutrality, supra note 4. 
 41. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5614. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 5760. 
 45. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 46. Id. at 701–06. 
 47. Id. at 708–10. 
 48. See id. at 709 (“[T]he Commission noted that its past regulatory treatment of broadband likely had a 
particularly small effect on investment because the regulatory status of broadband service was settled for only a 
short period of time.”); id. at 710 (“Given this shifting regulatory treatment, it was not unreasonable for the 
Commission to conclude that broadband’s particular classification was less important to investors than increased 
demand.”). 
 49. See id. at 746–47 (casting doubt on the FCC’s claims about insufficient reliance and the extent of the 
zigzags leading to the 2015 Order, and explaining that “[i]f a regulatory switch will significantly undercut the 
productivity and value of past investments, made in reasonable reliance on the old regime, rudimentary fairness 
suggests that the agency should take that into account in evaluating a possible switch,” especially because “a 
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The panel decision was controversial. A number of judges, including now-
Justice Kavanaugh, dissented. Relevant here, Kavanaugh argued that “[t]he 
FCC’s net neutrality rule is a major rule for purposes of the Supreme Court’s 
major rules doctrine,”50 meaning that it could only stand with “clear 
authorization” from Congress, which Kavanaugh concluded was lacking.51 
According to Kavanaugh, only Congress, not the FCC, could subject the internet 
to common-carrier obligations. 
E. THE 2018 RECLASSIFICATION 
In 2018, the FCC again reversed course and “revert[ed] to its pre-2015 
position.”52 That reversal was also challenged in the D.C. Circuit and largely 
upheld. As to reliance, the panel did not address the Commission’s first 
argument—that no one in the industry had, in fact, relied in a “serious” way.53 
Instead, the panel focused on the FCC’s arguments that “the 2015 rules had been 
in effect ‘barely two years before the Commission proposed to repeal them,’ a 
limited period to engender reliance,” and further that “in light of the 
Commission’s approach to classifying cable modem service and Internet access 
since the late 1990s, the Title II Order could reasonably have been viewed as a 
regulatory step that might soon be reversed.”54 In other words, the panel relied 
upon analysis very similar to what the panel had used in the 2016 decision. 
Judge Millett, however, wrote separately to express her frustration with 
Brand X—and in particular, Brand X’s conclusion that “classification of 
broadband as an information service was permissible.”55 According to Millett, 
echoed by Judge Wilkins,56 the Supreme Court should conclude “that the 
‘factual particulars of how Internet technology works,’ have changed so 
materially as to undermine the reasonableness of the agency’s judgments.”57 Put 
differently, if she could write on a clean slate, it is quite likely that Millett would 
 
pattern of capricious change would undermine any agency purpose of encouraging future investment on the basis 
of new rules”) (Williams, J., dissenting in part). 
 50. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from reh’g 
en banc denied); see id. at 402 (Brown, J., dissenting from reh’g en banc denied) (concluding that “turning 
Internet access into a public utility is obviously a ‘major question’ of deep economic and political significance”). 
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1185 
(2018) (“[T]he ‘major questions doctrine’ . . . forbids agencies from interpreting ambiguous statutory language 
in a way that ‘would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in [their] regulatory authority 
without clear congressional authorization.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. 
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). 
 51. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 425 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from reh’g en banc denied) (“The 
problem for the FCC is that Congress has not clearly authorized the FCC to classify Internet service as a 
telecommunications service and impose common-carrier obligations on Internet service providers. Indeed, not 
even the FCC claims that Internet service is clearly a telecommunications service under the statute.”). 
 52. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 53. Id. at 63–64. 
 54. Id. at 64. 
 55. Id. at 87 (Millett, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 56. See id. at 94–95 (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
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hold—in light of how the internet works today—that the FCC has no authority 
to classify broadband as an information service. 
F. 2020 AND BEYOND? 
Will the FCC’s current approach be long for this world? Perhaps not. After 
all, there is reason to think that “the FCC in a Democratic administration could 
simply bring back the Obama-era regulations, or rules very much like them, 
without an act of Congress.”58 Assuming President Trump wins re-election (and 
it is always risky to bet against an incumbent), moreover, the White House likely 
will flip political hands again at some point while this issue remains salient. So 
the zigzagging may not be done yet. 
II. A THEORY OF STICKY REGULATIONS 
I have offered my theory of sticky regulations before and will not repeat it 
in full here. The basic idea is straightforward: To the extent that a legal scheme 
can quickly change, rational actors in the private sector are less willing to make 
long-term investments in reliance on that scheme, at least at the margins.59 
Uncertainty is a problem for regulated parties. But uncertainty can also be a 
problem for agencies. If agencies cannot credibly commit that the law won’t 
change, they will struggle to achieve policy objectives that depend on long-term 
investment from the private sector.60 Flexibility, thus, is not always a blessing 
for agencies. Too much of it and policy suffers, especially long-term policy. 
So where do we find legal stability? Statutory law—and, a fortiori, 
constitutional law—is (relatively) stable precisely because the enactment 
process is difficult.61 A statute must pass both houses of Congress and ordinarily 
survive a potential presidential veto.62 Given filibuster rules in the Senate and 
other competing matters that call for congressional time, achieving that much 
policy consensus is difficult even when the same party controls all of Congress 
and the White House—which rarely happens. When Congress is divided or the 
White House is controlled by one party and Congress by the other, it can even 
be more difficult to navigate bicameralism and presentment. Indeed, 
operationally, requiring bicameralism and presentment can have the same effect 
 
 58. John Hendel, House Democrats’ Net Neutrality Win Likely DOA In Senate but Poised to Become 2020 
Issue, POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/10/net-neutrality-2020-
election-issue-1331217.  
 59. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 90–91. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Nielson, supra note 14, at 1212 (citing John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG 
2D 191, 204 (2007)). 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Of course, it is possible for Congress to override a presidential veto by a 
two-thirds majority in each chamber; that process is obviously difficult and rare. Indeed, “[h]istorically, 
Congress has overridden fewer than ten percent of all presidential vetoes.” Override of a Veto, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/override_of_a_veto.htm (last visited June 28, 2020). 
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as a supermajority voting requirement.63 Amending the Constitution is even 
more difficult.64 
But what about administrative law? The plain terms of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) do not suggest much stability. Section 553 of the APA, at 
least on its face, requires few procedures for informal rulemaking. All an agency 
must do is publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with “(1) a statement of the 
time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the 
legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.”65 Then, after soliciting comments, the agency is allowed to issue a 
final rule, so long as it contains “a concise general statement of [its] basis and 
purpose.”66 Nothing in the APA expressly bars an agency from reversing 
direction. The closest the APA comes is the requirement that agency action not 
be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,”67 which—as Fox holds 
and the FCC’s internet decisions confirm—is not much of a check. At the same 
time, agencies receive deference for their reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous law that they implement,68 and, under Brand X, that deference 
sometimes allows agencies to override some judicial decisions. As Jonathan 
Masur has demonstrated, Brand X also reduces stability because the public 
knows that even a prior judicial decision often will not constrain an agency’s 
ability to reverse course.69 
So is there any stickiness in administrative law? Yes. Despite the APA’s 
minimalistic text, courts—perhaps driven by constitutional avoidance70—have 
for generations construed the APA to impose procedural requirements on 
agencies. For instance, not only must agencies offer “the terms or substance of 
the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved,”71 but they 
also must turn over any relevant data in order to encourage meaningful 
comments.72 Agencies also not only must solicit comments, but they also must 
respond to all “material” ones.73 Agencies too must ensure that the final rule is 
a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule; if the final rule varies too much from 
 
 63. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 703, 712–13 (2002) (citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233–
48 (1962); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2001)). 
 64. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018). 
 66. Id. § 553(c). 
 67. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 68. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 69. See Masur, supra note 10 (arguing this point at length). 
 70. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 
1295 (2012) (“Instead of invalidating modern administration on constitutional grounds, the Court has often 
addressed the constitutional concerns that modern administrative governance raises through administrative 
common law doctrines.”). 
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 
 72. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 96–97 (citing Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 
(D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 73. See id. at 97 (citing City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
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what was submitted for public comment, a reviewing court will invalidate the 
rule and make the agency start over.74 Final rules must also withstand “hard 
look” review, which can require agencies to spend a great deal of time thinking 
through the policy, further creating delay and procedural costs.75 And to top it 
all off, in recent decades, the White House—acting through a series of executive 
orders—has imposed additional requirements on the rulemaking process, at least 
for significant rules.76 All of this naturally makes it more difficult for agencies 
to rapidly change direction. Indeed, for that reason, these requirements are often 
lamented as “ossifying” rulemaking. Yet that very ossification also creates some 
stickiness that agencies can use to encourage greater private-sector reliance on 
their rules. Some ossification, thus, expands an agency’s menu of options by 
creating a credible commitment mechanism that the regulatory scheme is stable. 
III. HOW MUCH STICKINESS? 
 Moving beyond theory, however, how much stickiness does ossification 
create? It surely creates some, but how much? The FCC’s zigzagging treatment 
of the internet suggests that the answer may be: not much, particularly for high-
profile decisions to which agencies will devote a great many resources. When 
the FCC decided to regulate broadband providers as common carriers, it was 
able to put together a lengthy rule (114 pages) relatively quickly (approximately 
twelve months between issuing a proposed rule and issuing a final rule). And 
when the FCC decided to stop regulating broadband providers as common 
carriers, it could also do that through a lengthy rule (71 pages) prepared quickly 
(approximately seven months). Perhaps other types of regulations are subject to 
greater ossification, but at least for regulatory schemes like the FCC’s, it is hard 
to say that the regulatory gauntlet creates much stickiness. 
Assuming that lack of stickiness is a problem,77 what can be done to create 
regulations endowed with greater glue? Here, I sketch out some options. To be 
clear, I am not saying that these options are the only ones, or even that they are 
worth doing. Nor am I saying that they would not carry with them costs of their 
own, including unintended consequences. I am saying, however, that these 
options would increase stickiness. Simply put, it is hard to see how we can avoid 
zigzagging policy without some changes to the structure of administrative law. 
A. CURTAIL BRAND X 
One approach is to curtail Brand X. With Brand X, agencies can more 
readily change regulatory schemes. Hence, by parity of reason, without Brand 
X, a regulated party could more readily rely on an agency regulation, at least if 
 
 74. See id. at 97–98 (citing Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 213 (1996)). 
 75. See id. at 98 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983)). 
 76. See id. at 99–100 (collecting citations). 
 77. It is not certain that this assumption is true. Stickiness is not always valuable. Indeed, stickiness can be 
downright problematic, especially for policies that lack majority support. 
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a court had previously interpreted the statute.78 Brand X, moreover, already has 
critics.79 It is peculiar that an agency can override a judicial decision about the 
meaning of the law. 
The problem with this approach to increasing stickiness is that it is hard to 
reconcile with Chevron—which may be a problem with Chevron.80 But if 
Chevron is right, it is hard to see how Brand X is wrong,81 at least when applied 
to rulemaking where concerns about retroactivity are diminished.82 To be sure, 
to the extent that Chevron is a fiction,83 perhaps the Supreme Court could revise 
the fiction to say that Congress never intended an agency interpretation to 
supersede a judicial decision. Or perhaps the Supreme Court could say that if the 
Justices themselves have interpreted a statute, an agency could not retreat from 
that meaning.84 Brand X itself is odd because it was the Ninth Circuit, not the 
Supreme Court, that had previously interpreted the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act.85 Neither of these potential revisions to Brand X seems especially consistent 
with the internal logic of Chevron. Both, however, would make regulations 
stickier. 
 
 78. See Masur, supra note 10, at 1024; cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 800 (2017) (noting that agencies may intentionally downplay the existence of 
ambiguity to prompt courts to rule in their favor at Chevron’s first step, and thus, lock in the interpretation). 
 79. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from cert. denied) 
(urging Supreme Court to overrule Brand X); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Brand X . . . risks trampling the constitutional design by affording executive agencies 
license to overrule a judicial declaration of the law’s meaning prospectively, just as legislation might—and all 
without the inconvenience of having to engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“If you accept Chevron’s 
claim that legislative ambiguity represents a license to executive agencies to render authoritative judgments 
about what a statute means, Brand X’s rule requiring courts to overturn their own contrary judgments does seem 
to follow pretty naturally. But acknowledging this much only brings the colossus now fully into view.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) (“A 
contrary rule would produce anomalous results. It would mean that whether an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would turn on the order in which the interpretations 
issue. . . . Yet whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend 
on the order in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur.”). 
 82. Allowing an agency to use Brand X when it attempts to make policy through adjudication—which is 
retroactive—is more problematic for reasons well explained by then-Judge Gorusch. See, e.g., Gutierrez-
Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). For what it is worth, Kristin Hickman and I elsewhere 
address whether Chevron should apply to interpretations announced in adjudication and whether preventing that 
might address Gorsuch’s concern. See Kristin Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
 83. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994, 998 
(1992) (describing Chevron as a “fiction”). But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013) (suggesting that Congress now legislates against Chevron’s backdrop). 
 84. Cf. Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 824, 827 
(2017). 
 85. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005) (“As the 
dissent points out, it is not logically necessary for us to reach the question whether the Court of Appeals 
misapplied Chevron for us to decide whether the Commission acted lawfully.”). 
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B. REVISIT FOX 
Another way to inject stickiness into regulations is to require agencies to 
place greater emphasis on reliance interests when replacing rules. Although it 
certainly contains a nod towards reliance interests,86 the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard in Fox does not 
place an especially high premium on stability. The Court explained that, when 
an agency changes policy, “it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that 
the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one,” and 
that it only needs to provide greater explanation when “serious reliance 
interests” are implicated.87 Fox therefore demonstrates that agencies have 
considerable freedom to reverse course, so long as they explain themselves and 
acknowledge the change.88 
A problem with this approach to reliance interests is that it is circular. 
Regulated parties, as sophisticated actors, will rely on agency regulations to the 
extent that the law allows them to rely, but no further. Thus, it is hard to see how 
“serious reliance interests” can exist when everyone involved knows the agency 
can change its mind. Accordingly, at least absent precedent that already holds 
that reliance would be reasonable (as is the case with old policies89 and perhaps 
other situations in which reliance is particularly acute90), the idea of reasonable 
reliance is puzzling, at least if reviewing courts give the word “reasonable” a 
descriptive rather than normative meaning. The D.C. Circuit’s rejection of 
reliance in its FCC cases appears to be based on a descriptive understanding of 
“reasonable”—namely, despite the FCC’s rulemakings, no one could 
reasonably expect a stable scheme.91  
 
 86. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring agencies to “provide a 
more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate” when revising a 
“policy” that “has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”). 
 87. See id. at 514 (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a 
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2128 (2016) (“[R]eliance does not overwhelm good reasons for a policy change.” 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 88. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 2, at 113. 
 89. See, e.g., Navarro, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (requiring “a more reasoned explanation for [an agency’s] 
decision to depart from its existing [and longstanding] enforcement policy.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“Reliance interests pose an especially formidable obstacle to an agency’s desired change in course 
in the context of government-issued permitting.”). 
 91. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[A]ssuming the change in agency position 
implicated serious reliance interests, we agree with the Commission that such reliance would have been 
unreasonable on the facts before us.”). The fact that agencies also speak with less than perfect clarity, especially 
when they try to demonstrate continuity over time, further complicates the search for “reasonable” reliance. See 
id. at 65 (“Petitioners’ effort to define the status quo as a whole era of Commission policy . . . renders the claim 
more or less non-falsifiable. While outside observers may associate ‘light touch’ with a distinct era in regulation 
and ‘open Internet’ with another era, the successive Commission majorities have consistently vowed fealty to 
both. . . . Petitioners may distrust the Commission’s stated dedication to an open Internet, but the ubiquity of 
Commissioners’ attachment to an open Internet (as well as to ‘light touch’) makes it impossible to rest a reliance 
claim on some notion that either phrase represented a discrete policy that has appeared and disappeared with 
each zig or zag of Commission analysis.”). 
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It is possible to imagine a different version of Fox, one that requires a 
significant showing of need before an agency could non-arbitrarily change its 
mind. Similarly, one could imagine allowing agencies to issue nonrevocable 
rules—though that seems problematic given that sometimes change can be quite 
valuable. To be sure, establishing a different version of Fox (one that is less 
accommodating to agency efforts to change regulatory policy) may well require 
congressional action given the text of the APA and stare decisis.92 But 
conceptually, the idea would be that regulated parties should have a real reason 
to rely on a regulation merely because it has been promulgated.93 Granted, this 
sort of regime may have unintended consequences, especially if administrations 
race to regulate so that their favored policies can be locked in. But, for purpose 
here, this approach would increase stickiness.94 
C. INCREASE OSSIFICATION 
Another way to create stickier regulations may be to increase the 
procedural requirements for agencies. As I have explained elsewhere, “a 
regulatory system that optimizes ossification will, all else being equal, require 
more procedures for regulations that benefit from a credible commitment 
mechanism or for which the subject is contentious than for other regulations.”95 
I’ve also explained elsewhere what some of those extra procedures may entail. 
Some types of rules may benefit more from stickiness. And some agencies may 
also benefit more from stickiness. For cases in which stickiness is valuable, 
Congress could require heightened procedures, such as cross-examination or 
judicially enforceable cost-benefit analysis.96 
Again, I do not claim that more procedures would be costless. Nor, frankly, 
am I confident that more procedures will always produce higher-quality rules 
(though they should at least sometimes). But to the extent that procedural costs 
make it harder for agencies to change policy, they also create stickiness, at least 
at the margins, as agencies have finite resources. 
D. REAL STICKINESS 
Finally, another answer for zigzagging regulatory schemes may be to 
prevent them altogether. The fact that an issue is likely to prompt zigzagging 
rulemakings may be a signal that Congress alone should be able to resolve it. 
 
 92. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 514 (“The [APA] mentions no such heightened standard.”). 
 93. Cf. Mingo Logan, 829 F.3d at 736 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining that changing position after 
an initial decision imposes greater costs on regulated parties, as, for example, “declining to hire someone is 
usually less disruptive to the individual than firing someone.”). 
 94. Related to this option is the possibility of absolute administrative stare decisis, meaning that once an 
agency interprets a statute, it is forever binding until Congress intervenes. Gus Hurwitz has explored this idea 
with particular focus on separation of powers. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain: 
W(h)ither Step Three?, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 615 (2019). 
 95. Nielson, supra note 14, at 1239. The word “ossification” is not ideal, because it suggests too much. I 
use the term, however, because it is so common in the literature. See id. at 1210 n.5. And to be clear, delay is 
not always good. See id. at 1213. 
 96. See id. at 1224. 
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Then-Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Janice Rogers Brown touched on this 
issue when they confronted the Net Neutrality rule and invoked the “major 
questions” or “major rules” doctrine. There, they argued that the FCC may have 
authority to address small policies, but it lacked authority to promulgate the Net 
Neutrality rule.97 In response to this argument, Judge Sri Srinivasan defended 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision—but his defense, largely resting on the Supreme 
Court’s Brand X decision, did not go to first principles.98  
Requiring congressional action for significant policies would enhance legal 
stability. Congress can provide greater stability than agencies, precisely because 
of Congress’ own onerous procedural obligations. It is not easy to navigate 
bicameralism and presentment. 
The premise of the “major questions” doctrine is that in “extraordinary 
cases,” such as cases with great “economic and political significance,” a 
reviewing court should not conclude that Congress authorized the agency to act 
absent a clear statement.99 The Court has applied this rule in a number of 
cases.100 One significant problem with the “major questions” doctrine, however, 
is that the test is difficult to administer.101 It can be challenging to know whether 
the agency is “regulating on a ‘major question’ of deep economic and political 
significance,” or whether it is “regulating on an interstitial matter.”102 After all, 
is the policy “truly an elephant—and not just a rather plump mouse,” and is the 
statutory hook “sufficiently unimportant to be a mousehole—and not just a 
rather cramped circus tent?”103 Bolstering the major questions doctrine would 
require grappling with this difficult question.104 
Even so, if the goal is to avoid zigzagging regulations, perhaps courts 
should more vigorously enforce the major questions doctrine. One possible 
solution, moreover, to the difficult line-drawing problems inherent in the major 
questions doctrine is to find a more objective way to distinguish between major 
and minor rules. For instance, perhaps agencies should not be allowed to 
 
 97. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting from 
reh’g en banc denied) (“The mere fact that a ‘statutory ambiguity’ exists for some purposes does not mean it 
authorizes the agency to reach major questions—statutory context and the overall scheme must be considered.”); 
id. at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“For an agency to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize 
the agency to do so. If a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful.”). 
 98. See id. at 385 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in reh’g en banc denied) (“The major question at issue here, 
according to our colleague, is whether the FCC can subject broadband ISPs to common carrier obligations. If 
we assume that the FCC’s decision to treat broadband ISPs as common carriers amounts to a major rule, the 
question then is whether the agency clearly has authority under the Act to make that choice. In Brand X, the 
Supreme Court definitively—and authoritatively, for our purposes as an inferior court—answered that question 
yes.” (citation omitted)). 
 99. See, e.g., FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (rejecting the 
argument that Congress “intended to delegate a decision of such . . . significance to an agency in so cryptic a 
fashion”). 
 100. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 403 (collecting citations). 
 101. See, e.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN L. REV. 19, 
45-46, 52 (2010). 
 102. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 403. 
 103. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 101, at 45. 
 104. See id. at 45–46. 
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promulgate regulations with an economic significance greater than $X, with $X 
decided by Congress.105 Similarly, perhaps when zigzagging regulations 
emerge, a reviewing court should be able to more readily conclude that the 
question is major. Candidly, that sort of line may also create perverse incentives, 
but it perhaps could create greater long-term stability too.106 
CONCLUSION 
Our nation’s oscillating approach to internet regulation is important in its 
own right. The lesson it offers for administrative law, however, is not limited to 
the internet. The reality is that in a polarized society, it is difficult for the White 
House to convince Congress to enact legislation. Presidents of both parties thus 
have increasingly turned to the administrative state, rather than Congress, for 
their policy goals. But policy made through the administrative process can be 
unmade through the administrative process, and to the extent that policies made 
through the administrative process lack bipartisan support, we should expect 
incoming administrations to undo what their predecessors have done. 
Zigzagging policy, however, is not costless, especially for policies that 
require long-term investment. So the question is: what to do about it? One 
answer may be nothing—the costs of foregone flexibility may not justify the 
benefits of enhanced stability. If we decide to do something, however, the ideas 
here should help. Other ideas too may also merit consideration. But absent 
structural reform, there may not be a lot of stickiness in administrative law, at 












 105. This dividing line may not be perfect either. Agencies also may try to evade dollar limits when they 
structure their rules. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1755, 1792 (2013). 
 106. Others have argued that independent agencies should receive less deference for policies than what other 
agencies receive. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron 
Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (2010) (“[S]uggest[ing] . . . ‘a reading of Chevron that 
accords less deference to independent agencies’ decisions than to those of executive branch agencies would be 
more consistent with our constitutional system and its values.’”) (quoting Randolph J. May, Defining Deference 
Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 453 (2006)). The FCC, of course, 
is an independent agency. That said, zigzagging policy need not be limited to independent agencies. See, e.g., 
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]hese days it sometimes seems agencies change their statutory 
interpretations almost as often as elections change administrations.”). 
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